Rule of 40 vs. Real Cash

It seems like whenever we go through a shift in the economy, the fundamentals of finance become increasingly important. During the near-zero interest rate environment we had for more than a decade, growth was rewarded in an outsized way. 10x and 20x revenue multiples were common for startups. Because the risk-free rate of return was near zero, there was no real opportunity cost in investing in something risky. That drove up the value of companies that were investing in big growth. Today, this has changed quite a bit. There is an opportunity cost to investing in something that might not generate cash for a while. So, a lot of the attention has shifted from growth to profitability. Investors want to see cash get generated more quickly. The Rule of 40 (ensuring that a company's operating margin % + its growth rate exceeds 40%) has become a common way of categorizing top-tier startups in this environment. Boards are pushing company leaders to get to Rule of 40 as quickly as possible. Given so many companies are coming out of the grow-at-all-costs approach, the easy thing to do is to pull back on investments, project a conservative growth rate, and drive down costs to make the company's operating margin high enough that it gets the company to 40+ in the next year or two.

This is a potentially short-sighted approach, especially for earlier-stage companies with small revenue. Returning to the fundamentals of finance, we know that the value of a financial asset is the present value of the cash that you can take out of it over its lifetime. Forecasting these cash flows is done using a discounted cash flow model. Revenue multiples and the Rule of 40 are crude proxies for understanding the present value of future cash flows. The danger of the Rule of 40 for smaller companies that aren't generating significant cash flows is that they underinvest in growth to achieve a higher operating margin at a point in time but never get to a point where the company generates high amounts of actual cash.

The Rule of 40 measures a point in time calculated using the % growth rate and the % profit. But companies are not valued on what they're doing right now. And they're not valued on their growth rate. And they're not valued on their profit margins. They're valued on real amounts of cash generated in the future. Rule of 40 can be a useful metric for investors to gauge the health of a business. But that has to be tempered with an understanding of the investments the company is making today to drive future real cash flows. 

One good way to manage this is to classify revenue and cost projections into two buckets. 1/ Core: revenue that will be generated from investments made in the past, and 2/ New: revenue that will be generated from new investments. Leaders need to really understand the future cash flows associated with their core business and whether or not that will produce adequate cash flows relative to expectations. That provides the input needed to throttle investments in new initiatives. The core should get more profitable and the new stuff should drive lots of new revenue. Blending the two and optimizing to a short-term metric runs the risk of severing the company’s execution plan from what’s best for investors over the long term.

What Artificial Intelligence Is Not

With all the hype around AI, I’ve seen the media and investors get a little bit sloppy with the definition of AI and have been calling things AI that aren’t AI. When there’s a big trend like this one, there’s a temptation to attach things to the trend that shouldn’t be attached to the trend. I’ve heard it’s hard to get meetings these days with top VCs if you’re not talking about AI in some form so founders are certainly incentivized to stretch. It’s worth defining what it actually means and what things are software versus AI.

Software that is not AI is running off of mid-20th-century technology. It effectively acts like a digital calculator. A programmer codes the software to do something, and the software behaves accordingly. The software is not thinking. It can’t do anything it wasn’t coded to do. If the software makes a mistake, that is the fault of the programmer who coded it.

Ai is much different. Ai mimics human intelligence. It can do more than what it was coded to do. ChatGPT describes itself this way:

The ability to learn, adapt, and generate contextually relevant responses based on patterns in data is what elevates it from traditional software to the realm of artificial intelligence. It's a software that, to some extent, can exhibit intelligent behavior and respond dynamically to various inputs.

One way to think about this is that software makes the human mind more efficient while AI mimics the human mind. From an investing perspective, this difference is really, really important. As this technology develops, given the massive productivity gains from a technology that can do the job of a human infinitely more quickly, 24 hours a day with no breaks could cause us to totally rethink how to value companies that create and/or leverage this technology.

Some VC Insights

This recent episode, 20VC Roundtable: Is the Venture Model Broken? was one of the best I’ve heard in close to ten years of listening.

I found myself jotting down a few notes. Listen to the whole thing, but here are some of the highlights:

  • VCs tend to jump to the “next big thing” (Crypto, AI, etc.) because that’s how you get markups on your investments. But, by definition, the “next big thing” isn’t contrarian and, in theory, wouldn’t be where the outsized returns are. There is an interesting conflict for VCs between showing a good markup and getting actual returns.

  • In venture, patience is an arbitrage.

  • The true outlier investments, in theory, are the cheap investments. That’s because they’re truly contrarian, and nobody wants to invest in them.

  • Pre-product-market-fit, stay as lean as possible. If you get ahead of the market, the team will have built things that aren’t perfectly aligned to the market, and they’ll develop opinions about what the market needs based on what you have and what’s been built. Slow that down and make sure the market is pulling and you’re not pushing.

  • When you have product-market fit, your next customer should be marginally more attractive than the last one. e.g., you shouldn’t have to be straining your offering to get more customers. At some point, everyone should want it.

  • Often, a company’s go-to-market is better than its product-market fit, and you can fool yourself into thinking you’ve found it.

Capital Allocation Inside Companies

I loved this Tweetstorm from The Secret CFO on capital allocation.

You should read it in full, but the key point for me is that if a company has capital to invest, the default position should always be to return it to shareholders via a stock buyback or a dividend.

There are three things a company can do with capital:

1/ strengthen their balance sheet (hold cash or pay down debt)
2/ invest in growth
3/ return capital to shareholders.

The default position should be #3.

There’s an old saying that “profitable companies have run out of ideas.” Meaning that if you make a profit it means you’re not investing in new products and services that will drive future growth. This is a fun saying, but it sort of implies there’s something wrong with being out of ideas or taking a profit. Of course, there’s nothing wrong with this. Companies are designed to create shareholder value. Generating profits and giving the cash back to investors so that they can go out and spend it or invest it as they please is the definition of creating shareholder value. Apple, the most profitable company in the country, had a net income of just under $100 billion last year and paid out a large part of it to shareholders in the form of dividends. They’ve created a high hurdle for new investments in growth. If they don’t expect a new initiative to create a huge amount of value, they default to returning that capital to shareholders.

Obviously, in the early stages of a company, the priority has to be building something such that generating profits is even possible. In these cases, all available capital goes towards growth. But later-stage companies that are generating a material amount of cash through their core business should default to giving capital back to shareholders. Using this as the default position creates a very healthy discipline, ensuring that new investments in growth are fully thought through and approved with the proper amount of analysis, rigor, and skepticism.

Tech Company Layoffs

There’s been quite a bit of news over the last several weeks of tech companies freezing hiring and laying off employees. Perhaps most notably, Meta (formerly Facebook) recently laid off 11,000 employees or 13% of its workforce. I thought I'd write a post about what tech companies are thinking about and the factors that are contributing to these unfortunate announcements. First, some history:

Until about a year ago, the stock market had been on a bull run for about 13 years. There are several reasons for this, but the primary reason was that, during this time, we had zero or near-zero interest rates. When interest rates are near zero, companies can borrow money almost for free, allowing them to invest heavily and grow, grow, grow. In addition, when interest rates are so low, money flows out of fixed-income investments and into riskier equity investments (the stock market). More money in equities means higher stock prices for public companies. Public company stock prices are a proxy for private company valuations, so private companies have experienced the same dynamics. This enabled companies to raise enormous amounts of money with little dilution for founders and shareholders. Due to classic supply and demand forces, more money in equities means that the same company with the same financial profile could be valued at 2 or 5, or 10 times what it would be worth in a less bullish market.

It was a great ride until COVID hit, and the economy stalled because people couldn't leave their homes and go to work and buy the goods and services they had been buying in the past. To get us through the crisis, the federal government rightly provided a massive economic stimulus to businesses and consumers by pushing more than $6 trillion into the economy. Again, more money in the system means higher prices for everything (including stocks). Due to COVID, we also saw major global supply chain issues and price spikes across nearly every category (again, the effects of supply and demand; reduced supply of products drives higher prices). Thankfully, the economy quickly recovered and Americans had surpluses of cash that they were anxious to go out and spend. And they did. As a result, we're now seeing historical levels of inflation. The inflation rate for the period ending in September was 8.2%; the average is closer to 3%.

This level of inflation is very dangerous. If prices increase faster than wages, it can literally topple the economy. And there have been lots of examples of this happening in the past. Luckily, the federal government can contract the money supply to slow inflation (less money in the system leads to lower prices). This has the effect of raising interest rates. And that's exactly what has happened; the federal funds rate sits at around 4%, the highest since 2008.

As a result, money has poured out of equities, particularly tech equities. The broader S&P 500 index is down about 15%, and the tech-focused NASDAQ is down about 30%. Tech companies get hit much harder in these cycles because they're investing in future growth and often carry a lot of debt. Because the profits from these investments won't be realized until further out in the future, increased interest rates discount the values of these future cash flows by an excessive amount (more on this soon).

An additional challenge is that as the Federal Reserve contracts the money supply and interest rates rise, it's not very predictable how quickly that will temper price inflation, so there's no way to know how long this drop in the markets and company valuations will persist. And there are reasons to believe it could get worse before it gets better. 

For companies trying to navigate all of these changing conditions, their worlds have become much more difficult. Valuations are way down. As recently as 10 days ago, Facebook’s stock price hit $88, down from a peak of $378. Stock options granted to Facebook employees over the last 6 or 7 years are likely worthless.

Further, the cost of capital (both debt and equity) for companies has significantly increased. This hits technology companies, which, as I mentioned above, typically have higher levels of debt because they're investing in new growth, particularly hard. The cost of running these businesses becomes much more expensive because the cost of debt increases (increased interest expense). In addition, some of these debt covenants have requirements around growth and profitability that companies need to meet. 

Moreover, and this is probably the most important part of what's going on that should be well understood, is that because tech companies are investing heavily in new growth, the profits from those investments won't be realized for several periods. And higher interest rates hit growth-oriented companies very hard because of the discount rate of future cash flows (more on that here). This is a very important economic concept that many in the tech ecosystem don't understand well enough. Said simply, a company is valued on its ability to generate future cash flows. And increased interest rates lead to a discount in the current value of these future cash flows far more than for companies that are profitable now. When interest rates are zero, there's no discount applied to future cash flows, so the market seeks high-growth companies that are making big, bold bets. When interest rates rise, investors look for companies that have profits now. Again, this is simply because of the discount applied to future cash flows.

Finally, and more broadly, businesses are seeing what's happening and are concerned that jobs will be lost, spending will slow, demand for their products will decrease, and a recession (two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth) might be on the horizon and bookings and revenue may decrease.

That's the situation tech companies find themselves in today. So how are they responding?

Well, it's important to remember that a company's primary purpose is to maximize shareholder value (for external investors and employees holding stock options). Management has a legal duty to its shareholders to operate in a way that maximizes the value of the company, regardless of the changing markets and the lack of predictability around when things will get better or worse. So in a market where near-term profits and cash flows are very highly valued, companies must pare back longer-term growth investments and find ways to cut costs to realize profits more quickly. And, because, typically, the vast majority of expenses of a tech company come from human capital (employees), the only material way to do this is to slow hiring or decrease headcount.

And this is exactly why we're seeing all of the news reports of tech companies freezing hiring and laying off employees.

Of course, some will criticize these companies for hiring too fast and overextending themselves, and voluntarily getting themselves into this situation by investing too heavily too fast. In many cases, this criticism is fair. But it's worth noting that, while cost reduction has rapidly become very important, in a bull market, growth is inversely and equally important. Facebook, as an example, is taking a lot of heat for overhiring engineers, but should they? I’m no expert on Facebook, but it’s an interesting thought exercise to think through for any company. Again, the job of a company is to maximize shareholder value. And when capital is cheap or free, the companies that invest heavily in growth will receive the highest valuations (again, refer back to the discount rate applied to future cash flows). At scale, had Facebook and the other tech giants chose not to make those hires, those individuals would've been unemployed during that period or would've received lower wages from other companies during that period, possibly displacing less talented engineers. If a company has viable ideas and areas to grow, and capital to invest in that growth is freely available, it must pursue that growth. It must maximize shareholder value. Companies with high growth potential have to play the game on the field. They have to pursue growth if they believe it's there. This is an unavoidable cycle that innovative companies are subject to. And individuals that work in the tech ecosystem will inevitably be the beneficiaries – and the victims – of these realities. Other industries experience far less dramatic highs and lows.

Of course, it should be noted that these highs and lows seriously impact people's lives. And I've been glad to see many companies (though not all) executing these cost reductions with humility, empathy, and generous severance packages.

With all of this said, inevitably, at some point, inflation will slow, interest rates will decrease, companies will invest in growth, companies will start hiring again, we'll be back in a bull market, and everything will seem great. In the meantime, it's important that all stakeholders that have chosen to work in and around tech understand and plan accordingly around the macroeconomic cycles that have a disproportionate effect on this industry.

Consensus vs. Non-consensus

I recently heard a technology investor say that if most of his friends don’t laugh at him for investing in a company, then he knows it’s not a good investment. While this is a little strong, there’s definitely some truth to the statement, particularly in venture capital, where your big winners drive most of the returns. If you’re investing in a company that everyone believes will be successful, then you’re investing with the crowd, and your returns are limited. To maximize returns, you have to bet against the consensus and be right when everyone else is wrong.

Consensus and wrong — you lose your money
Non-consensus and wrong — you lose your money
Consensus and right — small ROI
Non-consensus and right — big ROI

Refusing To Fail

I heard Phil Mickelson, the legendary golfer, tell a great story the other day.

He was asked what makes the best golfers the best golfers in the world. He told a story about how a long time ago, he really struggled with short putts. One day his coach recommended that he try to make 100 three-foot putts in a row. If he missed one, he'd have to start all over again. And he should keep practicing this until he can reliably make 100 in a row. He claims that one time he made it all the way to 99, missed the 100th, and started over. 

Years later, he was mentoring an up-and-coming amateur golfer who was struggling with short putts, and he gave that golfer the same advice. Several months later, he checked in on how the golfer was doing with his putting, and the golfer said, "yea, that was really hard, I got to where I could make about 50 in a row, and I gave up.”

This golfer never made it in the PGA.

This is a great analogy when thinking about startup investing. Often, in the early days, you're really investing less in the idea or the product or the market; you're really investing in the founder themselves and their willingness to persevere and navigate through the idea maze and do what, in some cases, seems impossible. Some people work on some projects where for whatever reason, they will absolutely refuse to fail. Elon Musk is a great example. Both SpaceX and Tesla should've failed multiple times. But he persevered and forced it to happen through sheer will. Of course, he's incredibly smart and talented, but that wouldn't have been nearly enough. This quality doesn't exist in everyone, and even for those that do, it doesn't exist for every project at every time in their lives, given changing life circumstances and priorities.

This golf analogy is a good one to consider when you're investing at an early stage where you don't have much to go on other than the talents, skills, and dedication of the founder and founding team.

The Operator Shortage

Howard Lindzon described the current state of startups really well the other day on the Animal Spirits podcast. I’m paraphrasing, but he said something like:

There are lots of good ideas. There are lots of founders that want to pursue those ideas. There’s lots of cheap capital for founders to raise and build companies around those ideas. But there’s an extreme shortage of qualified operators to go and execute on those ideas.

There aren’t enough high-quality operators that have actually built companies from the ground up. As a result, we’re seeing significant wage inflation across almost every function inside of startups. The ability to recruit and retain top talent is more important than it has ever been in tech (Apple just offered $180k bonuses to engineers to get them not to leave and go work on the metaverse or crypto). Good companies won’t have a problem raising capital, but almost all of them will struggle to hire the best people.

Build a brand that attracts both customers and potential employees. Hire managers with high levels of followership.

Be a company that people want to work at with leaders that people want to work for. Nothing is more important in this market.

LTV, CAC, & B2C

Whenever I consider investing in a B2C startup, I immediately ask about the company's LTV/CAC ratio. From the Corporate Finance Institute:

LTV stands for "lifetime value" per customer and CAC stands for "customer acquisition cost." The LTV/CAC ratio compares the value of a customer over their lifetime, compared to the cost of acquiring them. This metric compares the value of a new customer over its lifetime relative to the cost of acquiring that customer. If the LTV/CAC ratio is less than 1.0 the company is destroying value, and if the ratio is greater than 1.0, it may be creating value, but more analysis is required. Generally speaking, a ratio greater than 3.0 is considered "good."

I’m less interested in the actual numbers than I’m interested in how the company is thinking about improving the numbers over time.

You could argue that a startup shouldn't be overly concerned with this metric in the early stages because they're still building the initial product or trying to find product/market fit and get the company off the ground. I disagree. B2B startups can get away with deprioritizing this metric in the early days because a good sales team can reliably acquire large amounts of users and revenue in large batches. And because of the way decisions are made within an enterprise, churn is typically significantly lower.

For B2C companies, LTV/CAC should be a part of the story from the beginning. Acquiring individual users is difficult and expensive. And since Facebook and Google, there haven't been that many widespread and effective ways of acquiring new users. Most of the high-quality channels are saturated. 

Ideally, B2C startups can bake user acquisition into their fundamental product offering; e.g. a supplier in a marketplace might bring their customers to the platform at no cost to the platform. AirBnB is a good example where landlords will often ask renters to book rentals through AirBnB.

Obviously, this won't be possible for every company. But the point remains: user acquisition and churn mitigation are critical considerations for any B2C startup right from the start.

The Convergence Of Private & Public Valuations Is Good For Employees 

There’s been a lot of talk in the tech blogosphere over the last couple of weeks about the convergence of private and public valuations. One of the things that hasn’t been talked about all that much is how important this convergence is for employees at early-stage companies. I was talking to a founder recently and he was telling me that he really struggles with the tradeoff between the importance of showing the world that his company has a unicorn-like valuation versus the importance of keeping his valuation low so that new employees can see lots of value in a follow-on round or an IPO.

On one hand, being a unicorn gets you lots of good press and attention and is for good sales and good for recruiting. On the other hand, a huge valuation makes it hard to deliver value to employees in the form of stock options — if you’re already a unicorn, it’s likely that future employees have missed the big uptick and equity becomes a lot less valuable from a compensation perspective. When you have a potential bubble in the private market and normalcy in the public market, lots of employees are going to find their options are deep underwater. Castlight Health learned this the hard way following their IPO last year (see image below).

Castlight IPOBecause of the emergence of crowdfunding, angel syndicates, private exchanges, and a lower regulatory bar to invest in early-stage startups, it’s likely that we’ll start to see much more consistency between private valuations and subsequent public valuations. Also, don’t underestimate tools like eShares that help founders manage complex cap tables. I can vividly remember being at a startup where we didn’t want to give out stock options to consultants for no other reason than it would’ve added too much complexity to our cap table. It's a lot easier for a private company to manage thousands of investors than it used to be.

A founder’s desire to push for a massive valuation is perfectly understandable. It creates a buzz that helps recruit employees and close big deals. But when founders push too hard for a private valuation that won't hold up when employees find liquidity, it's bad for the team that built the company in the early years. It's great to see private and public valuations beginning to converge.

Should Amazon Be Profitable?

I've been meaning to write a post about Amazon and its strategy to never make a profit in a given year, but Benedict Evans beat me to it in this great post and podcast from a couple of weeks ago. I recommend reading the post. After looking at Amazon closely, there are three things that really jump out at me:

1. Revenue has grown every year since 1996 and net income has remained flat, at near zero.

Amazon Growth

2. Every dollar in profit goes directly back into the business. They're investing most of the profit into capital expenditures such as new warehouses and Amazon Web Services but they're also using it to rapidly enter new verticals in e-commerce. There literally must be someone whose job is to make sure they don't make a profit in any given year.

3.  A lot of people are asking how long Amazon will continue reinvesting their profits instead of passing them onto investors (even a great innovator like Apple pays out a nice dividend). How long can Amazon keep investing in themselves? Benedict uses a Wal-Mart comparison. Currently, while Amazon is an enormous player in e-commerce, they still only make up around 1% of North American retail sales. So asking Amazon if they should continue to invest in their growth is a little like asking Wal-Mart if they should've kept investing in new stores back in the 1960s. The answer for Wal-Mart was yes in the 1960s and it's yes for Amazon in 2014.

The Bright Side Of The Big Private Companies

There’s been quite a bit of talk in the blogosphere over the last few weeks about the death of the IPO. Most notably here and here. Most are blaming the paralyzing regulation that came along with Sarbanes Oxley following the financial crisis. They're pointing to the fact that Uber, Airbnb and Dropbox recently raised private financing at $10 billion plus valuations. And that Twitter waited until they were worth $25 billion before going public. And that Facebook waited until they were worth $100 billion before public. The problem with this is that most of the uptick in these valuations was missed by the average investor (U.S. law prohibits non-accredited investors from investing in private companies).

There’s definitely a problem here. And it's terrifying to think about what Washington might try to do to fix it.

But rather than focus on the unfortunate aspects of the growth of these companies, I thought I’d focus on the good. Seeing these companies lumped together made me realize that these companies are all adding significant value to the economy, regardless of how they're funded.

As the global economy continues to transform and push out jobs that can be automated or sent offshore, these companies are doing the opposite -- they're creating massive numbers of new jobs that can't.

AirBnB has turned close to a million homeowners into part-time landlords (many of them in the U.S.). Uber has turned every street corner into a cab stand and in the process has created hundreds of thousands of near six-figure jobs.

Some might argue that these companies are just transferring hotel jobs and cab driving jobs to someone else. Not true at all. In industry after industry we've seen that as it becomes easier and more convenient to transact, more people get in the game. More people are traveling thanks to AirBnB and more people are hitching a ride thanks to Uber. These companies are growing the pie and helping the economy in the process.

There are lots of other marketplaces that are creating freelance sources of income (Clarity, Angie's List and Google Hangouts to name a few). And I wrote about the enormous number of  jobs that the iOS and Android marketplaces created a while back.

There's no doubt that most Americans are missing out on the big equity gains coming from these hyper-growth startups, but the jobs that these companies are creating is potentially far more impactful. And seeing new technologies create net new jobs in the short-term instead of wiping them out is a trend that shouldn't go unnoticed.

Attackers & Defenders

A few years ago I had the pleasure of meeting Steve Case -- the original founder of AOL and current CEO of Revolution. He was considering an investment in our company and I was lucky enough to be able to pitch him our business. In the short time that I spent with him I could tell that we were dealing with an extremely savvy investor. He got right to the key issues surrounding our growth and his questions were extremely challenging and relevant.

I came across an interview that he did recently with Adam Bryant from the New York Times. In talking about different types of businesses, he said this:

...I realized the world of business really separates into these two groups. The attackers are the entrepreneurs who are disrupting the status quo, trying to change the world, take the hill, anything is possible, and have nothing to lose in most cases. They’re driven by passion and the idea and intensity. Large organizations — and it’s true of Fortune 500s and it’s also true of governments and other large organizations — are defenders. These guys aren’t trying to pursue the art of the possible, how to maximize opportunity. They actually are trying to minimize the downside, and hedge risk. They’re trying to de-risk situations. Entrepreneurs can’t even think this way. It’s not even a concept they understand.

For the traditional executives running these large companies, of course they want to grow, of course they want to innovate, of course they’d rather have revenue grow faster than slower, but they mostly don’t want to lose what they’ve got. But entrepreneurs are deathly afraid that they won’t be able to change the world, and that somebody else will. Again, these generalizations are a little unfair, but corporate executives are all too often deathly afraid that the business they inherit will be less valuable when they leave than when they started.

This is so true and exactly why no company will last forever. Even the best eventually flame out. The cycle of disrupt >> succeed >> defend is unavoidable and, frankly, perfectly logical. When companies reach a certain level of success, innovation becomes too risky and the smarter, rational move is to protect your turf.

This is why companies like Apple are so impressive and so rare. They somehow continue to attack and innovate despite their immense success.

5 Reasons You Should Read Blogs Written By VCs (even if you're not a VC or a founder)

The other day I was looking through my blog feed (I use the Reeder iOS app) and it occurred to me that I follow just under a dozen blogs written by venture capitalists. My three favorites are Fred Wilson, Chris Dixon and Bijan Sabet.

I started thinking about why I read so many of these blogs. I'm not a VC, and I don't really want to be. Are they really worth the time?

Here's why I think they are absolutely worth the time. Any why you should read them too.

1. Because of the risk profile of VCs they are always ahead of the game. VCs focus on ideas and technologies that, for the most part, are ahead of their time. They make investments in ideas that are highly risky that haven't yet gone mainstream but eventually will. Whether you're just investing for yourself, thinking about staying ahead in your career or just a curious person, it's important to be aware of what's coming next. In addition, most of them are investing in consumer products. An extra perk is that VC blogs will help you stay aware of consumer software and services that you might want to use yourself.

2. They attract communities of smart, motivated people. Every day I read blogs on sports, career, fitness, healthcare, technology and marketing and it seems that the VC blogs get way, way more comments from readers than the others. In addition, the quality of conversation happening in the comments sections of VC blogs is extremely high. Often when I read a VC blog I'll only scan the post but I'll scroll down and read the most popular comments in detail (there's great stuff in there). The people hanging out on these blogs are people you want to hang out with (at least virtually). In addition, I'm sure there are some out there, but I haven't yet seen a VC blogger that doesn't interact with their readers.

3. They'll make you a better blogger (and thinker). One of the neat things about VC bloggers is that they don't have all the answers -- and they know they don't have all the answers. In their posts, you'll find that they're really just putting out ideas, and thinking out loud (if they had all the answers, their investments wouldn't be so risky). As a result, they'll help you generate some great ideas on things to write about and think about. See an example here.

4. They write about things that you should know about. I remember back in college the career counselors would tell us, "before you go into an interview, make sure you know what's being written about on the front page of the Wall Street Journal." Those days are over. These days, if you're interviewing in tech, you better know what VC bloggers are writing about.

5. They'll give you better context. One of the challenges in working at a startup (or any company, really) is that you don't always get to see the context of leadership. I always try to remind people to keep in mind that everyone has a boss (the exec team reports to the CEO and the CEO reports to the board). CEOs don't make decisions to make your life miserable, they make decisions to help make the company better -- or, more practically, to make their boss (the board) happy. I've found that by reading what's going on in the mind of VCs (who very often hold board seats) I get to see a bit of what a founder or CEO is facing. And that gives me a better understanding of what their context might be when making decisions that impact my team. In any company or any situation, context is crucial.

I highly recommend the three blogs I mentioned above. In addition, Forbes did a pretty good article a while back on the Top 10 Best Venture Capital Blogs. I recommend checking out some of those as well.

My Investment Approach

Lately I've been investing in individual stocks a bit more than usual. I'm pretty picky about the stocks that I buy. I was talking to a friend the other night about how I pick them and thought I'd post my approach here. When buying an individual stock, I only invest in two types of companies:

  1. Companies that make products or services that I use and that I love. This includes stocks like Amazon, Tumi and FedEx.
  2. Companies that are in the industry that I work in, that I know a lot about and that I believe in. Currently, this would be a company like Athena Health.

The only way to gain an advantage in the stock market is to bet against conventional thinking -- and be right. By investing in companies that I personally know and love or know and understand significantly more than the average investor, I'm at least putting myself in a position to gain an advantage.

Disclaimer: while I would certainly advocate that others use my approach to investing, I of course wouldn't advocate that anyone invest too much of their worth in individual stocks (it's too risky, regardless of your approach). Best to put most of your wealth in less risky, diversified investments with a modest but reliable return.

The Big 4 Internet Companies (Continued)

A year ago this month someone asked me this question: if I had to invest in one of the big four internet companies -- Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google -- which one would it be? Without hesitating, I chose Amazon. I wrote a post about my reasoning at the time.

One year later, I thought I'd check in to see if I made the right choice. Here's how each of the stocks performed in 2012:

  • Facebook - down 17% (since their IPO in March)
  • Apple - down 1%
  • Google - up 33%
  • Amazon - up 47%

So it turns out I made the right call. Too bad I didn't put my money where was my mouth was.

That said, it's not a completely missed opportunity. I definitely think there's still a lot of money to be made on Amazon. I'm probably even more bullish on them now then I was 12 months ago.

Taxes

The two most significant taxes that Americans pay each year are a tax on their income and a tax on their investment. The income tax is a tax on people's labor. Firefighters get paid for fighting fires. Teachers get paid for teaching our kids. And CEOs get paid for driving their company's strategy. Depending on how much they get paid, they pay a portion of that pay to the government. The tax brackets break down like this for a family:

  • 10% on taxable income from $0 to $12,400, plus
  • 15% on taxable income over $12,400 to $47,350, plus
  • 25% on taxable income over $47,350 to $122,300, plus
  • 28% on taxable income over $122,300 to $198,050, plus
  • 33% on taxable income over $198,050 to $388,350, plus
  • 35% on taxable income over $388,350

So a father that is raising his kids and working as a firefighter putting out fires and adding direct value to society through his work making $150,000 is paying 28% of the value of his labor to the government.

The investment tax -- capital gains and dividend taxes -- taxes something different. That taxes a bet.

When someone invests in Facebook and the value of the stock increases, or the company pays out some of their profit in the form of a dividend at the end of the year, the profit that the investor made is taxed. This is passive income -- the investor is just sitting there watching the money come in. He's not necessarily adding incremental value to society on top of his investment (in most cases).

There's nothing wrong with this -- investment is critical to a prosperous economy -- and the investor should make as much as he possibly can on his investments. But because he's adding less direct value to society, if we're going to tax him, we should tax him at a higher rate than we tax direct, value-creating labor. Simple, right? Right.

But we don't do that. Here are the current rates:

  • 20% on capital gains
  • 15% on dividends

So the investor that makes $150,000 per year in capital gains pays 8% less than the firefighter does for his labor.

And this is why our tax code is backwards. This is why Warren Buffet's assistant pays a lower tax rate than he does. This is why, in 2009, the Americans with the top 400 incomes (who made, on average, $202 million per year) paid a lower tax rate than you did. One quarter of them paid less than 15%, and more than half of them paid less than 20%.

We have to fix this. I'm not going argue what the tax rates should be (at least not today).  But I am arguing that we have to flip the structure so that tax rates on labor are lower than the tax rates on investment. It's just backwards.

In his controversial New York Times article, Buffet suggested the following solution:

I would suggest 30 percent of taxable income between $1 million and $10 million, and 35 percent on amounts above that. A plain and simple rule like that will block the efforts of lobbyists, lawyers and contribution-hungry legislators to keep the ultrarich paying rates well below those incurred by people with income just a tiny fraction of ours. Only a minimum tax on very high incomes will prevent the stated tax rate from being eviscerated by these warriors for the wealthy.

Of course this won't fix the entire fiscal mess and I think we need to go a step further and flip the tax structure so investors pay a higher rate than workers regardless of their income. But Buffet's plan is a step in the right direction of creating a fairer tax code that incentivizes the activity that leads to greater prosperity for the country as a whole.

Margin Call

Margin Call Over the holidays I watched the movie Margin Call (for the second time).

The movie is a fictional depiction of an investment bank crumbling during the 2008 financial crisis (it was likely inspired by the real life Bear Stearns or Lehman Brothers). The story revolves around a brilliant, young analyst in the company's risk management group. One night he discovers that the company has over-leveraged itself through an over-investment in synthetic CDOs and MBSs. Throughout the night and into the early morning the analyst's discovery makes its way to the highest levels of the company. The movie is a depiction of how the company handles the crisis.

Margin Call is a phenomenal movie. It's brilliantly acted by some excellent actors (Kevin Spacey, Jeremy Irons, Stanley Tucci, Zachary Quinto, Simon Baker and Demi Moore to name a few). And the suspense around watching management learn what has happened and how they handle it elegantly depicts what were probably real events inside many investment banks at the time. The more senior you were, the less likely you were to understand the financial mechanics behind the crisis.

In what is probably the best scene of the movie, the young analyst (played by Zachary Quinto) is asked to explain what he has discovered to the CEO of the company (played powerfully by Jeremy Irons). Irons' character says to him:

Maybe you could tell me what is going on. And please, speak as you might to a young child. Or a golden retriever. It wasn't brains that brought me here; I assure you that.

That line just about sums up much of the cause of the financial crisis of the late 2000s. The people on the ground were packaging and selling a product that management at our largest and most reputable financial institutions did not -- and could not -- understand.

If you haven't seen it yet, I highly recommend renting Margin Call.

Results From My Super Bowl Commercial Experiment

5 years ago when I started this blog, I had a theory. The theory was that participating in big, broadcast marketing was a bad strategy. And that companies that continued to participate in it would likely see their stock prices fall over time. To test this theory, I selected a group of 6 companies that ran television commercials during that year's Super Bowl and noted their stock prices with the intention of measuring their performance against the S&P 500 index. The 6 companies were Pepsi Co., E-Trade, Anheuser Busch, Coca Cola, Bridgestone and FedEx.

Anheuser Busch was of course acquired by InBev back in 2008 so 5 years later that leaves me with 5 companies to test my theory. Here are the results:

  • The S&P 500 outperformed the mean of the Super Bowl stocks by just over 13%.
  • The S&P 500 dropped 2.2% during this period and the 5 Super Bowl stocks dropped 15.3%.
  • The S&P 500 outperformed 3 of the 5 Super Bowl stocks.
  • Only one stock price increased during the period (Coca Cola by 22%)
  • E-Trade's stock price ell by 83%.

Given the small sample size, I'm not sure the data is all that conclusive. But it certainly doesn't conflict with my theory. So I'll stand by it for now...

Groupon, Chest Pain And Consumer Behavior

It was unfortunate – but not very surprising – to see the news this week that Groupon laid off a portion of their 10,000 employees. If ever there was a predictable bubble, it was daily deals. But it was fun while it lasted, and you can see why there was so much overinvestment in the space. Groupon’s pitch to merchants was to ask them to take a loss by making a super compelling offer that consumers couldn't resist. The offer would generate tons of new customers that would come back and make profitable purchases for years to come.  On the surface, it seemed pretty compelling.

With the Groupon news in mind, I spent some time this week thinking about the problem of hospital readmission penalties in the healthcare industry.  For those that don’t know, the government is trying to improve accountability and the quality of patient care by imposing financial penalties on hospitals that have high rates of 30 day hospital readmissions.  Depending on the rate of readmission, the government will reduce Medicare payments by as much as 1%.  For an industry with very thin margins, this is a pretty big deal.

One of the major challenges with hospital readmission penalties is that now doctors have to not only care for the patient effectively during the initial encounter, they’re now responsible for changing the patient’s behavior after they leave the hospital.

Here’s an example: imagine an older man that doesn’t take care of himself.  He smokes, eats fatty foods, lives a sedentary lifestyle and hasn’t visited a doctor in years. One day, a pain in his chest becomes so severe that he is forced to check himself into the emergency room.  After spending a couple nights in the hospital getting treatment, he starts to feel better. When he’s finally discharged, the doctor recommends that he stops smoking, follows a cardiac diet, takes a prescribed medication, and visits a cardiologist for a checkup every week for the next 6 weeks.

But this is a person that is not used to doing any of those things. The problem that caused him to appear in the hospital – severe chest pain – is not an immediate problem for him anymore.  He feels fine.  So the hospital is being asked to significantly change the behavior of someone without the initial (and powerful) motivator in place. As a result, he’s very likely not going to follow the doctor’s orders and he’s very likely going to reappear at the emergency room.

It occurred to me that this is the fundamental problem with the daily deal industry.  Groupon has the same challenge that hospitals have.  Just like severe chest pain, their deals change behavior. Most of the people that buy half-off skydiving, or cooking classes, or services at the super expensive nail salon, weren’t planning to do those things until they saw the deal sitting in their email inbox.  But because the deals are so compelling (50%+ off) they bought them anyway and, as a result, Groupon was able to flood their merchant clients with lots of new business.

But it’s because the initial deal is so compelling that it becomes nearly impossible for Groupon to reliably deliver on their ultimate promise of bringing their merchants new, loyal and profitable customers.  Just like severe chest pain, the daily deal changes behavior.  It forces people to do something that they wouldn’t normally do.  But without a continuous and powerful motivator in place (like chest pain or 50% off) the doctor can’t get the patient to come in for an electrocardiogram and the nail salon can’t get the customer to come back for a second manicure.